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At a recent panel discussion of Gilmore's The Death of Contract, Profes-
sor Richard Danzig remarked on how the accepted forms of publication limit
legal scholarship.' Gilmore's book and the academic response to the book
are good illustrations of this point. The Death of Contract is a compilation of
lectures delivered by Professor Gilmore at the law school of Ohio State
University. It retains in print the charm and informality of the oral lecture;
even the footnotes, added apparently as a concession to the academic
community, are interpolations of the text rather than lapidary citations of
authority. 2 But what is truly remarkable about the book is the academic
response it has generated. Virtually every leading scholar of contracts law in
the United States today has written an extended comment on the book. Yet
these commentaries are called Book Reviews and consequently are buried in
the back of law journals and the Index to Legal Periodicals. The commen-
taries are not Articles because law journal Articles are traditionally "origi-
nal" works with a full array of academic support in the footnotes; they are
not Comments or Notes because only students write these lower forms of
academic literature. 3
* B.A., LL.B., Harvard University; LL.M., University of London. Associate Professor
of Law, Southern Methodist University.
I. The remarks were made by Professor Danzig at the annual meeting of the Commercial,
Contract & Related Consumer Law Section of the Association of American Law Schools, Dec.
27, 1976, in Houston, Texas.
2. The published lecture is an accepted form in academic legal literature. See, e.g., the
publications of the Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures at Harvard, the Thomas M. Cooley lectures
at Michigan, and the Storrs Lectures on Jurisprudence at Yale. Few lectures survive in print as
well as those of Professor Gilmore. See also G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
Few published lectures have received the attention that THE DEATH OF CONTRACT has. At last
count more than fourteen reviews of the book have been published in American law journals
with the total number of printed pages now more than double the pages in THE DEATH OF
CONTRACT.
3. Professor Danzig also mentioned the publication of monographs as articles, which in
effect inhibits circulation of the monograph. He cited in particular Macneil, The Many Futures
of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974). But see D. KING, THE NEW CONCEPTUALISM OF
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1968) which reprints major portions of two articles published
in the St. Louis University Law Journal. Note, however, that the publisher of King's mono-
graph is the St. Louis University School of Law.
Danzig's point can easily be exaggerated. Some law journals are more receptive than others. I
am reminded of the difficulty Professor Richard Abel had in publishing his brilliant review of
M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW (1972); several leading journals
apparently rejected the review because it was too long to be published as a Book Review. The
review was finally published as a titled review essay: Abel, Law Books and Books about Law,
26 STAN. L. REV. 175 (1973). See also Quinn & Lidji, Book Review, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 119 (1976)
(33 pages). Other journals are less disturbed by formal categories. The Wisconsin Law Review,
for example, has a separate category for "Commentary." See, e.g., Tushnet, Perspectives on
the Development of American Law: A Critical Review of Friedman's "A History of American
Law," 1977 Wis. L. REV. 81.
As this "commote" was going to press I received a special issue of the Michigan Law Review
commemorating that Review's 75th year. The editors state:
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As I listened to Professor Danzig at the panel discussion I remembered my
own reaction to an article written by Danzig on the jurisprudence of the
Uniform Commercial Code.4 I had made extensive marginal notes on a copy
of the article, had commented on the article to my commercial law class, and
had even considered writing the author to quibble about several points.
Danzig's remarks at the panel discussion encouraged me to ask the editors
of the Southwestern Law Journal if they would be interested in publishing
my "commotes" 5 on Danzig's article. With their blessing, therefore, what
follows is not a formal Article written as a Reply to Danzig, 6 but a relatively
informal elaboration of thoughts provoked by Danzig's article.7
II. DANZIG'S THESIS
Professor Danzig's main thesis is that critical provisions of article II of the
Uniform Commerical Code abdicate legislative responsibility by leaving to
courts the discovery of legal rules in the context out of which a legal dispute
arises.' He recognizes that commercial law may be atypical in that it deals
with a subcommunity of professionals. He also notes that the Code was
drafted subject to political pressure for widespread uniform adoption.
We told our authors from the start that they would be freed from the traditional
standards of size, style, and format that occasionally turn law reviews into
compendiums of encyclopedic articles. Essays of moderate length were wel-
come, but many are much shorter than the usual law review fare. Several are
fully documented and heavily footnoted, but this was not required or even
encouraged. We sought in this issue to give our contributors an opportunity to
contemplate, comment, speculate, or even criticize in a forum not usually
congenial to such pursuits.
Editor's Preface, 75 MICH. L. REV. Nos. 5 & 6, i-ii (1977).
Nor is Danzig the first to call attention to publishing conventions which limit the usefulness
of academic scholarship. Karl Llewellyn noted, for example, the illogical convention of ne-
glecting course-books as a source of legal scholarship. See Llewellyn, On the Problem of
Teaching "Private" Law, 54 HARV. L. REV. 775, 781-82 (1941).
Students of comparative law, of course, have long been aware of the different forms
academic literature takes in different countries. Law teachers from Commonwealth countries,
for example, frequently have impressive bibliographic r6sum6s but individual pieces are usually
much shorter than those of their United States' colleagues. A comparative study of law
publishing would offer rich insight into differences in legal culture.
4. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 621 (1975). Note that Danzig designates his article as "A Comment" and refers to it as
an "Essay." Id. at 622.
5. "Commote" is a portmanteau word (comment-note), with overtones of "emote" and
"stir up a commote." Even the editors of this Journal, although approving the publication of
this "commote," had some initial difficulty determining under whose editorial jurisdiction it
would fall.
6. After writing the text I was interested to discover that Professor Danzig has on
occasion resorted to the formal Reply. See Danzig & Lowy, Everyday Disputes and Mediation
in the United States: A Reply to Professor Felstiner, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 675 (1975). The Reply
is an accepted form of legal literature and there are a number of examples of lively exchanges,
not the least of which is Llewellyn's response to an article by Pound. Pound, The Call for a
Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931); Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism-
Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931). The convention is that the Reply is
published in the same journal as the original article.
7. The only other extended comment I have found on Danzig's article is a note by
Professor Gilmore in his latest book. See G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 140-41 n.38. See also
Casebeer, Escape from Liberalism: Fact and Value in Karl Llewellyn, 1977 DUKE L.J. 671, 677
n.24.
8. 1 have found it difficult to summarize accurately Professor Danzig's article and I urge
the interested reader to read the original. It should be noted that Danzig felt he may have
oversimplified the contrast between Llewellyn and the Hart-Sacks' jurisprudential approach.
Danzig, supra note 4, at 624 n.10.
[Vol. 31
1977] UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE JURISPRUDENCE 845
Nevertheless, Danzig argues that Karl Llewellyn's jurisprudential prefer-
ences reinforced these situational factors.
Danzig contrasts Llewellyn's jurisprudential ideas ("preferences,"
"choices") with those of the late Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Dean
Albert M. Sacks as expressed in their great underground classic on legal
process.9 Hart and Sacks, as summarized by Danzig,'0 consider the legisla-
ture a law-making body whose goal is to maximize social utilities. The
legislature is democratically elected and politically responsive. It is guided
by ethics and economics. It views law as a vehicle for growth, and lawyers
as specialists in enlarging the pies of social living. In contrast, Llewellyn
views the legislature as setting out guidelines for courts to find the law which
is "immanent" in a specific fact pattern. The critical legal institution,
therefore, is not the legislature but the courts, which have low visibility and
little responsibility to the general public. The courts rely on the methods of
sociology and anthropology. The lawyer occupies a more passive role in
relations with the client because it is the client who knows the fact patterns
from which the court will idetermine the legal rule for resolving the dispute.
Danzig suggests that article II's aim and achievement might be viewed as
dictating a method by which courts may arrive at a result rather than
dictating a particular result. But Danzig ultimately concludes Llewellyn just
does not like statutes.
Initially my intuition was that Article II of the UCC might profitably be
analyzed as an attempt to coerce courts into deciding cases in the Grand
Style by means of the devices described in the text. As I examined the
'policies' endorsed by Article II, however, I came to the conclusion that
at least in this instance Llewellyn was rather like Fuller's Judge Foster.
His 'penchant for creating holes in statutes reminds one of the story
• . . about the man who ate a pair of shoes. Asked how he liked them,
he replied that the part he liked best was the holes. That is the way he
feels about statutes; the more holes they have in them the better he likes
them. In short, he doesn't like statutes."'
It is Llewellyn's "denigration" of legislation which, Danzig suggests, deter-
mined much of the Code's form and content.
Danzig also places particular emphasis on the Code's alleged indifference
to moral imperatives.12 Law-making, he suggests, requires going beyond a
narrow focus on what "is" to a consideration of what "ought to be." The
Code does refer to "good faith,"' 13 "unconscionable,"' 4 and "decent deal-
ers."' 5 But the Code, Danzig argues, assumes that these value-terms have an
9. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).
10. The summary of Hart & Sacks set out in the text is taken from Danzig's article. Danzig,
supra note 4, at 624-25.
II. Danzig, supra note 4, at 632 n.39. The quotation from Professor Lon L. Fuller is from
Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616,634 (1949). The footnotes
in Danzig's article round out his text and should be read with care.
12. Fuller, supra note I1, at 627-31. Danzig notes that a similar charge of amorality was
made against the American realists and he suggests that the jurisprudential connection between
the critiques of the Code and legal realism has been neglected.
13. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), -203, 2-103(1)(b). All references are to the 1972 OFFICIAL
TEXT WITH COMMENTS unless otherwise noted.
14. Id. § 2-302.
15. Id. § 1-205, Comment 5.
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objective existence which can be discovered by careful examination of the
factual situation. Several reasons are then given as to why this approach is
disturbing: it reaffirms predominant morals; it encourages judges to project
their own values; critical choices are left to institutions which are not
responsible to the public; it undermines certainty and consistency; and it
focuses on the parties at hand rather than on community-wide concerns.
Finally, Danzig rejects the suggestion that commercial law compels leaving
questions of utility to private parties.
Danzig concludes his essay with a brief summary of his thesis:
It is suggested here that the animating theory of Article II is that law is
immanent. The law job is to search it out. There is thus no need for a
legislature to create law. The central focus, as in all the writings of the
realists, is on courts. Article II is a document whose thrust is not so
much to put law on the statute books as it is to coerce courts into
looking for law in life.' 6
III. COMMOTES
A. Llex Llewellyn
A basic assumption of Professor Danzig's article is that the Uniform
Commercial Code, especially article II, can be taken as a true measure of
Karl Llewellyn's jurisprudential perspective. Indeed, Danzig suggests that
the Code may teach us more about the jurisprudence of American Realism
than Llewellyn's "lifetime of lectures on law-in-theory."' 17 In a footnote
Danzig qualifies this assumption by noting Permanent Editorial Board
amendments and legislative revision, 18 but he makes no attempt to evaluate
the extent of these modifications on Llewellyn's original input, and he
ultimately concludes that "if ever a statute can be taken as suggestive of a
legal philosophy this seems to be such a case."' 9
Much has been written about the extent of Karl Llewellyn's influence on
the Uniform Commercial Code by virtue of his position as Chief Reporter of
16. Danzig, supra note 4, at 635.
17. Id. at 621-22.
18. Id. at 621 n.3. This footnote reads:
The Uniform Commercial Code reflects, of course, much more than the thought
of Karl Llewellyn. For an analysis strongly downplaying his influence in the
original drafting, see Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code, an Experi-
ment in Democracy in Drafting, 36 A.B.A.J. 419 (1950). The original drafts were
themselves modified as a result of both legislative revisions, . . . and amend-
ments suggested by the Code's 'Permanent Editorial Board.' But if ever a
statute can be taken as suggestive of a legal philosophy this seems to be such a
case. Article II was Llewellyn's area of interest. His wife and disciple was its
second most influential author. Both retained substantial influence over the
document through the period of the 1962 official text which is quoted in this
Essay.
19. Id. Compare Danzig's conclusion with the more tentative conclusion of Professor
David Carroll:
The most difficult aspect of defining the relationship between Llewellyn and the
Code . . . stems from the fact that it is impossible to assess accurately the
degree to which Llewellyn lost control of the Code or the extent to which his
purposes were frustrated. . . . In the final analysis, however, it is probably
only relevant to attempt to determine whether, from Llewellyn's standpoint, the
U.C.C. has or ever will have an overall beneficial effect on the societal balance
of the legal system.
Carroll, Harpooning Whales, of which Karl Llewellyn is the Hero of the Piece; or Searching for
More Expansion Joints in Karl's Crumbling Cathedral, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 139,
151-53 (1970). See also Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115
U. PA. L. REv. 485, 488 n.l1 (1967).
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the Code for the critical first ten years of its drafting. 20 In tribute to the
dominant role of the Chief Reporter the Code has been referred to as
"Llewellyn's Code," "Code Llewellyn," "Llex Llewellyn" and even
"Karl's Kode." 21 Many of these assessments, however, must be treated
cautiously as the hyperbole of memorial essays 22 or as a part of Code
campaign politics.
23
In his intellectual biography of Llewellyn and the American Realists,
Professor William Twining concludes his historical outline of the Code's
development with a summary of points for which he finds "widespread
agreement":
(ii) Almost all of the initial planning in respect of scope, objectives,
method and style was Llewellyn's and even the later editions of the
Code are remarkably close to his original conception.
(v) The Code was the product of teamwork. Llewellyn only excep-
tionally used his key position to push through pet ideas of his own in the
face of opposition; rather he regularly exhibited a rare openness to
suggestion ...
20. Typical of comments about Llewellyn's influence are Corbin, The Uniform Commer-
cial Code-Sales; Should it be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 821-22 (1950) ("Without question,
the leading spirit in the whole undertaking was the reporter, K.N. Llewellyn; but every other
member took an active and critical part in discussion and construction of all provisions.");
Friedman & Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract Teaching: Past, Present, and Future, 1967
Wis. L. REV. 805, 808 ("Probably the most important product of post-realist effort is the
Uniform Commercial Code; Karl Llewellyn was a vital force in its creation."); Kripke, The
Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L.F. 321, 321
("I made it clear that I had no intention of writing in the field of jurisprudence .... Persons
interested in this topic would do better to consult the jurisprudential writings of the late Prof.
Karl N. Llewellyn, the guiding spirit of the Code.").
For a wry comment on Llewellyn's drafting experience see Beutel, The Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code as a Problem in Codification, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 141, 143 n.5 (1951):
Professor Llewellyn during his service on the Commission on Uniform Laws
drafted some amendments to the N.I.L. which were never approved; he is also
the draftsman of the Trust Receipts and parts of many other uniform acts most
of which are narrow statutes. His most famed writings are in the field of
Jurisprudence; but he has published a case book in Sales.
For brief histories of the evolution of the Code see R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUC-
TION TO COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 19-31 (1977); 1953 HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFER-
ENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 139-50; W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND
THE REALIST MOVEMENT 270-301 (1973) (especially pp. 281-83).
21. W. TWINING, supra note 20, at 271. The sources Twining cites for these epithets include
F. WALLACH, INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL LAW 42 (1953); Franklin, On the Legal
Method of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 330 (1951); Gilmore, In
Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814 (1962); Mooney, Old Kontract Principles
and Karl's New Kode: An Essay on the Jurisprudence of Our New Commercial Law, I I VILL.
L. REV. 213 (1966).
For some reason authors of commercial law articles have a penchant for contrived titles. See,
e.g., the titles of the articles by Professors Carroll and Leff cited supra note 19. Unfortunately
few of these authors can sustain this wit beyond the title. For epigrams per page, however,
Professor Leff can certainly hold his own.
22. See, e.g., Gilmore, supra note 21.
23. See Professor Leff's collection of citations of "political" writings in Leff, supra note
19, at 488 n. ii. A particularly clear example is Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code:
An Experiment in Democracy in Drafting, 36 A.B.A.J. 419 (1950). See Danzig's reference to
this article, supra note 18. Dean Mentschikoff later concluded, however, that "[diespite the
numbers of persons involved in the drafting of the Code, the extent to which it reflects
Llewellyn's philosophy of law and his sense of commercial wisdom and need is startling."
Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 MOD. L. REV. 167, 168 n.3
(1964). This latter article is reprinted substantially unchanged in S. MENTSCHIKOFF, COMMER-
CIAL TRANSACTIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 3-12 (1970). It has been described as "obligatory"
reading for students. Donnelly, Materials on Commercial Transactions: Back to the Cur-
riculum Committee, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 94, 95-96 n.3 (1973).
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(vi) Although concessions were made to placate opponents, there
were few, if any, matters on which Llewellyn made sacrifices of princi-
ple or substance to save the Code ...
(vii) Llewellyn's principal contributions were made in the period 1937
to 1953, and most importantly in the first phases of planning and
drafting between 1940 and 1949.24
Twining qualifies this conclusion by noting that he does not attempt to dig
far below the surface of recorded events25 and that to assess how much of
Llewellyn's approach survived would require "a more precise set of
categories than we have at present for differentiating between different
styles and techniques of drafting." 26
Llewellyn himself on several occasions expressed dismay at the number
of amendments made to provisions he proposed or supported. "I am
ashamed of it [the Code] in some ways; there are so many pieces that I could
make a little better; there are so many beautiful ideas that I tried to get in
that would have been good for the law, but I was voted down." 27 On a later
occasion he wrote:
There are upwards of a hundred material places on which as Chief
Reporter I was outvoted on a position I believed in and was fighting for.
I doubt if time and thought have brought me round on as many as one
sixth of such points; a good twenty and more still cause grief which is
acute.
28
In the same article, however, Llewellyn goes on to emphasize that doubts
about details should be considered keeping in mind that they were subject to
"repeated majority votes of different but highly intelligent bodies of law-
yers, after informed and sustained meditation and discussion. '29 As for the
amendments Llewellyn regretted, he gives no details in these later works
except for his suggestion that there were "twenty or more" that he con-
sidered significant.
An obvious qualification on the pervasive influence of Llewellyn is that
while he was Chief Reporter for the entire Code he was responsible in the
first instance only for the drafting of the Sales provisions in article II and the
General Provisions in article I. Although these two articles reflect Llewel-
lyn's open-ended drafting style in many of their provisions, 30 the legislative
24. W. TWINING, supra note 20, at 300-01.
25. Id. at 300.
26. Id. at 2% (with particular reference to post-1952 amendments).
27. Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REV. 779, 784 (1953). Llewellyn
goes on to state, however, that "when you compare [the Code] with anything there is, it is an
infinite improvement." Id.
28. Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367, 374
n.2 (1957).
29. Id. This statement reflects Llewellyn's belief in the democratic process of drafting
emphasized by Mentschikoff, supra note 23, and by W. TWINING, supra note 20, at 301. On the
other hand, the procedure was not only dictated by the procedures of the organizations
sponsoring the Code but also by the political necessity of forestalling potential opposition
groups.
30. Dean Mentschikoff describes the drafting concepts as follows:
The most important drafting concept rests on the belief that relative certainty
and uniformity of construction depend on the court's perception of the situation
represented by the rule and the reason the rule was adopted, and that proper
construction follows the reason and is limited or extended by it. The attempt,
therefore, has been to draft rules so that both the situation being covered and its
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form in other articles is far less open-ended. Dean Mentschikoff notes that
"the conveyancing approach to drafting by all-inclusive detailed statement"
influenced amendments to the Code, and she mentions in particular the
amendments to article IV which she attributes to the influence of New York
banking counsel. 31 Professor Gilmore notes the same "conveyancing ap-
proach" taken by practitioners when revising the Code but he finds the
clearest example of this influence in article IX on Secured Transactions.
32
To the extent, therefore, that the title to Danzig's article suggests that he will
deal with the jurisprudence of the Code as a whole, it is misleading. 33
Reading Danzig's comments as limited to the final text 34 of article II, I
would agree with him that article II was shaped in large part by Llewellyn.
Anyone who has acted as a draftsman knows the tremendous power the
draftsman has to control the issues to be resolved as well as the actual
resolution of the issues. I do suggest, however, that Llewellyn's impact on
the final text should be reevaluated after a detailed and comprehensive
study of the evolution of the Code provisions, especially those which appear
in the early drafts.
The clearest indication that a reappraisal of Llewellyn's impact on the
Code is in order is a recent comment by Professor Gilmore which empha-
sizes the significant amendments made to the original. In a frequently-cited
passage written in 1962, soon after Llewellyn's death, Gilmore stated:
Make no mistake: this Code was Llewellyn's Code; there is not a
section, there is hardly a line, which does not bear his stamp and
impress; from beginning to end he inspired, directed and controlled
it. . . . He cheerfully gave ground when he had to: the final product
was indubitably his and will remain an enduring tribute to his memory.
35
In lectures delivered in 1976, however, Professor Gilmore places the Code in
the broader context of American legal history. In the course of his com-
ments he remarked:
On the whole and in the long run the conservatives or traditionalists had
their way. Llewellyn's proposals for a radical restructuring of the law-
as, for example, in distinguishing between the standards applicable to
reason tend to appear on the face of the language, and to keep the language
reasonably open-ended.
Mentschikoff, Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 MOD. L. REV. 167, 170 (1964).
Llewellyn's approach was shared by many of the draftsmen immediately associated with the
initial drafting of the Code provisions. See, for example, the defense of Llewellyn's open-ended
approach by Professor Gilmore, then Assistant Reporter for Article IX. Gilmore, On the
Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341 (1948).
31. Mentschikoff, supra note 30, at 171 n.9.
32. Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. COLO. L. REV. 461,472-73(1967). Gilmore
has on occasion, however, stressed the open-endedness of even article IX. Gilmore, Article 9:
What it Does Not Do for the Future, 26 LA. L. REV. 300, 300-10 (1966).
33. The text of Danzig's article refers only to article II and the title may have been
suggested by editors to catch the eye of potential readers who might be put off by an indication
that it deals only with an even narrower topic. Note that the obvious point that article II is
different in style from other Code articles is also made in G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 140-41
n.38.
34. "Final text" here refers to the 1957 official text after it had passed through the crucible
of review by the New York Law Revision Commission. Because of ill-health Llewellyn was
much less active in the Code campaign after 1955.
35. Gilmore, supra note 21, at 814-15. Professor Gilmore's full statement, especially his
remarks about Llewellyn's drafting style, should be read.
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'merchants' and those applicable to nonmerchants-survived the early
drafts only in an attenuated, watered down, almost meaningless form.
Provisions which would have notably increased the liability of manufac-
turers for their defective goods were simply deleted from the later
drafts. Not only the substance but the style of the Code changed
dramatically as the drafting process continued. . . . Llewellyn's code,
as he conceived it, would have abolished the past without attempting to
control the future. That jurisprudential approach did not satisfy the
groups of practicing lawyers who participated in the project and whose
influence increased as the drafting approached the final stages. . . . At
all events they insisted on a tightly drawn statute, designed to control
the courts and compel decision. To a considerable degree, they got what
they wanted.3 6
The next section develops several of Gilmore's recent comments through an
analysis of the "merchant" provisions in the early drafts. If Danzig's thesis
that the Code is a true measure of Llewellyn's jurisprudential perspective is
to be taken seriously, the following examination of early drafts should both
indicate more clearly the provisions in the final draft for which Llewellyn
was primarily responsible and add further examples of Llewellyn's jurispru-
dential choices.
B. A "Merchant's" Code
The Uniform Commercial Code went through numerous drafts before its
sponsors published the Final Text edition in November 1951.37 The texts of
these early drafts reveal numerous modifications to the sales provisions
which now comprise article 11.38 As suggested above, among the most
interesting of these modifications is the gradual attrition of Llewellyn's
initial emphasis on the need to develop special rules and procedures for
professional businessmen.
36. G. GILMORE, supra note 2, at 85. These gloomy remarks go further regarding changes in
substance than any other piece I have read by Gilmore. Indeed, the final text version of the
lecture goes further than the delivered lecture. See Gilmore, The Age of Anxiety, 84 YALE L.J.
1028, 1038 (1975). Gilmore had, however, remarked earlier on the changes in style from
Llewellyn's open-ended approach. See, e.g., Gilmore, Book Review, 73 YALE L.J. 1303, 1308(1964).
37. A list of the generally-circulated draft texts of the Code is set out in M. EZER, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE BIBLIOGRAPHY 1-6 (1972). Secondary sources indicate that there are a
number of unpublished intermediate drafts in the collections of some libraries. Professor Leff
refers to a number of such drafts. Leff, supra note 19, at 485 n. 1, 489 n. 12, and 494 n.34. Some
of Llewellyn's personal notes on article II are also apparently available. See Spies, UniformCommercial Code: Article 2--Sales; Performance and Remedies, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 629, 637
n.30 (1966).
Discussion of earlier drafts and comments in the text which follows explores Llewellyn'sjurisprudential approach and is not designed to suggest what the official text of the Code
"really means." For a criticism of Leff's use of legislative history as "not only risky but a little
silly," see R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 176-77 (1975).
See also the following comment:
It will have to be left to the Supreme Court of the United States to rule out the
use of prior versions of sections and comments as an unconstitutional form of
cruel and inhuman punishment of fellow lawyers. Or perhaps the decisive
argument will be that because of their scarcity (only a few libraries have them)
their use denies equal protection of the laws.
R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER
LAW 44 (2d ed. 1974). The 1952 text included § 1-102(3)(g) which stated: "Prior drafts of text
and comments may not be used to ascertain legislative intent." The 1957 official text omitted
this provision.
38. Professor Gilmore suggests that the influence of professionals outside the immediate
group charged with drafting the sales provisions was much less than was the case for other parts
of the Code. Gilmore, On Statutory Obsolescence, 39 U. CoLo. L. REV. 461, 473 (1967).
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Pre-Code commercial law purported to regulate all transactions, whether
carried out by a professional or a non-professional. The 1906 Uniform Sales
Act established rules of general application with only a few exceptions.
There was a specific reference to "a seller who deals in goods of that
description" in the rule governing the implied warranty of quality; 9 trade
usages or custom could negative or vary obligations otherwise arising by
operation of law.40 There was also the ubiquitous reference to the sup-
plementary principles of the "law merchant," whatever that meant.'
The first major revision of the Uniform Sales Act which is now generally
available is the 1941 "second draft" of a Revised Uniform Sales Act. 42 As
chairman of the special committee of the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws to consider the revision of the 1906 Act,43
Karl Llewellyn prepared the general Report and the Comments on individual
sections of the 1941 text. Although the Report stresses that the revised text
continues the concern of the 1906 Act for peculiarly mercantile situations,
the new draft goes well beyond the original Act in its recognition of the
distinct rules for professionals." The text of the draft Revised Act is the
forerunner of article II of the Uniform Commercial Code but only a few of
the 1941 innovations survive in the final text of the Code. 45 The 1941 text and
commentary, however, are worth exploring in some detail because they
represent Llewellyn's clearest statement before the direct influence of other
advisers became important.
39. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 15(2). Compare U.C.C. § 2-314.
40. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 71: "Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a
contract to sell or a sale by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express
agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by custom, if the custom be such
as to bind both parties to the contract or the sale." Compare U.C.C. § 1-205. See also id. § I-
201(11), 2-202, -314(3), -316(3)(c).
41. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 73. Compare U.C.C. § 1-103. For a brief discussion of "law
merchant" see Scrutton, General Survey of the History of the Law Merchant, in 3 SELECT
ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 7 (1909). See also Burdick, What is the Law
Merchant?, 2 COLUM. L. REV. 470 (1902); Ewart, What is the Law Merchant?, 3 COLUM. L.
REV. 135 (1903). Reference to the "law merchant" appears in a number of uniform commercial
laws. See, e.g., UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 5.
42. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS [NCCUSL],
REPORT AND SECOND DRAFr: THE REVISED UNIFORM SALES ACT (1941) [hereinafter cited as 1941
DRAFT]. There were earlier proposals to introduce a federal sales act applicable to interstate and
foreign commerce and built on the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act. Professor Williston,
draftsman of the 1906 Act, collaborated in 1922 with a committee of the American Bar
Association in the preparation of a draft federal act. Similar draft bills were introduced in
Congress in 1937 and 1939.,These draft bills provided an impetus to the proposed revision of the
1906 Act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. W. TWINING,
supra note 20, at 277-78. See also Thomas, The Federal Sales Bill as Viewed by the Merchant
and the Practitioner, 26 VA. L. REV. 537, 542-45 (1940).
43. Llewellyn was a Commissioner on Uniform State Laws, representing New York, from
1926 to 1951. He was appointed chairman of the Commercial Acts section of the NCCUSL in
1937. After the agreement between the NCCUSL and the American Law Institute in 1944
Llewellyn became Chief Reporter for the Uniform Commercial Code. W. TWINING, supra note
20, at 104, 278 & 281-85.
44. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 42, at 18-19. See also id. at 20-21. The Report acknowledges
that the 1941 text goes beyond the original 1906 Act. "The lines of relation of this Second Draft
to the Original Act of 1906, are . . . those of preservation and development of the essential
frame, and of supplement-supplement largely either by developing implications or by provid-
ing implementation." Id. at 18.
45. For general discussion of the "merchant" provisions in the final text of the Code see
Dolan, The Merchant Class of Article 2: Farmers, Doctors, and Others, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. I;
Newell, The Merchant of Article 2, 7 VAL. L. REV. 307 (1973). The specific "merchant"
provisions in the 1906 Act survive in one form or another in the final text of the Code. See
U.C.C. §§ 1-103, -205, 2-314.
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Among the 1941 provisions which survive are the definitions of "mer-
chant" and "between merchants." '  The definition of "between mer-
chants" appears first 47 and the accompanying Comment sets out the follow-
ing principles underlying the Act's scope:
The reasons for making this category appear in the Report, and
appear again and again in the particular sections of the Draft which
are expressly extended only to professional dealings between profes-
sionals.
Such persons, in regard to such dealings, have an understanding of
trade practice, habits and skills of adjustment, needs for speedy action,
probable commitments, access to counsel, which make many provi-
sions both needful and feasible for them which are neither needful nor
feasible for, say, farmers or household consumers.
Mansfield's incorporation of the law merchant into the common law
was in all fields but that of Sales the incorporation of a body of law
tailored directly and skillfully to the needs of merchants in their deal-
ings with other merchants-to which body of law other men had to
conform, or (as in the case of lawyers' partnerships) appropriate excep-
tions could be made.
In Sales this did not occur; and such specially adapted law as mer-
chants have received has been worked out so to speak under cover, by
way of 'general' rules of supposedly 'general' application, which just
happen to apply to situations in which the participation of a non-
merchant approaches the unthinkable. Examples are the 'to arrive'
contract, or C.I.F. But experience shows that precisely these purely
mercantile rules have given the most clarity and the most satisfaction,
within the whole Sales field.
The Draft proposes to free the matter from confusion by bringing
such situations out into daylight, tailoring rules to special mercantile
need where there is such need, but not inflicting such rules on non-
professionals, when non-professionals might be at a disadvantage under
them.48
The Comment on the definition of "merchant" also stresses that the con-
cept includes "all such professionals in the market, and only such. " 49
46. U.C.C. § 2-104.
47. Llewellyn's primary interest apparently was to separate out transactions in which only
professionals are involved. Only secondarily was he concerned about the general obligations
imposed on a professional by virtue of being a professional.
48. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 42, § 1. The comment goes on to refer to § I-B, discussed at
note 69 infra and accompanying text, and to distinguish the proposed revised text from
continental Commercial Codes:
There is here no borrowing of the Continental troubles and confusions as to
when a transaction is 'commercial' and when it is 'civil'. That confusion rests
first of all on 'commercial' transactions being worked out as transactions by a
merchant. The Draft deals with transactions between merchants, which are
unambiguous, under the definition. Secondly, the Continental trouble rests on
the setting up of two rigidly severed set of rules. The Draft allows adjustment by
use of the 'between merchants' rule wherever it is apt to the case.
Id. at 38. For a fuller explanation of the continental distinction between "civil" and "commer-
cial" law, see Schlesinger, The Uniform Commercial Code in the Light of Comparative Law, I
INTER-AM. L. REV. I1, 36-42 (1959). Not all commentators on the Code agreed with Llewellyn
that the U.C.C. is unlike continental Commercial Codes. See the remark by the late Professor
Carl Fulda to the New York Law Revision Commission: "a distinct departure from traditional
notions and a move in the direction of European legal systems whose Commercial Codes
establish separate legal rules for merchants." 3 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION
COMMISSION FOR 1955, at 2165 (1956). See also Keyes, Toward a Single Law Governing the
International Sale of Goods-A Comparative Study, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 653, 658 & 660 n.23
(1954).
49. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 42, at 43.
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In addition to these two basic definitions, the 1941 text introduces several
significant mercantile innovations which do not survive in the final text of
the Code. The most interesting of these is the attempt to institutionalize the
finding of mercantile facts through merchant experts. Sections 59 to 59-D of
the 1941 draft50 provide a procedure "to accomplish speedy and competent
determination of questions of fact which fall within the field of special
merchants' knowledge rather than of general knowledge." 51 By these provi-
sions, either party in a sales dispute between merchants is empowered to
submit specially the following questions of mercantile fact to "a special
sworn expert tribunal":
52
(a) The effect on the terms or conditions of the sale or contract to
sell, of mercantile usage, or of the usage of a particular trade;
(b) The conformity or non-conformity in quality, routing, or any
other mercantile aspect of any delivery, to the duties or conditions
resting on the seller, and the measure of the discrepancy, if any; and
whether any defect in performance has been substantial;
(c) The mercantile reasonableness of any action by either party, the
mercantile reasonableness of which is challenged;
(d) Any other issue which requires for its competent determination
special merchants' knowledge rather than general knowledge.5 3
The procedures for demand, selection, hearings, and determination are set
out. Although the parties initiate the submissions to the merchant experts,
the trial court retains control of the proceedings. The court settles the issues
of mercantile fact to be submitted, 4 selects the experts if the parties fail to
do so," and presides at the hearing.5 6 Although a unanimous finding by the
experts may be received in evidence in the particular dispute5 7 a Comment
notes that the procedure is not designed to build precedent since "[t]he
fixing of trade practice and standards is believed to be properly a task for
associations. "58
This machinery for the determination of mercantile fact is the foundation
on which other important 1941 draft provisions rest. The Report notes the
difficulty courts have in spelling out the relation of trade usage to particular
language.5 9 It suggests that a prime reason for the confusion is the jumble of
both reasonable and dubious "usages" which appear in court opinions and
which result from the lack of machinery to determine usages. "But if usage
can be determined with some reasonable reliability, then the policy of the
Original Act, of giving to usage as full a scope as reason will permit, is the
only sound policy."6 The draft text, therefore, spells out in detail the place
50. Id. t 254-57, 288.
51. Id. § 59(2).
52. Id. § 59-C(l). The introductory Comment to these sections rejects the idea of a general
"commercial court" on the ground that it could not keep abreast of commercial usages in a
hundred different trades. Id. at 252-53.
53. Id. § 59(l).
54. Id. § 59-A(4).
55. Id. § 59-B(4). The court is directed, however, "to take into account the existence of any
trade association or arbitration association having special panels, which may be available." Id.
56. Id. § 59-C(2).
57. Id. § 59-D. The experts' findings must be unanimous or the court will appoint a new
panel. Id. § 59-C(3).
58. Id. at 256.
59. Id. at 55.
60. Id. (emphasis in original).
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of trade usage. 61
Merchant experts are also essential for the concept of "mercantile per-
formance" introduced by the 1941 draft. 62 Pre-Code law did not grant the
seller the privilege of making a non-complying delivery and forcing the
buyer to accept an adjustment where the defect was not substantial. The
buyer, on the other hand, was granted the analogous privilege of accepting a
defective delivery but still recovering damages for the defect.63 The 1941
text changes this rule by barring the merchant buyer's right to reject where
the merchant seller shows there has been "mercantile performance" as
contrasted with exact performance.64 The policy behind mercantile perform-
ance is set out in the text itself:65
The principle of mercantile performance is that a contract between
merchants calls for a performance having the expected substance, but
that discrepancies are not to interfere with the flow of goods in com-
merce unless they are in mercantile fact material discrepancies, and
unless an appropriate money-allowance against the price can give no
adequate compensation for failure of exact performance.'
Mercantile performance is also defined in the text.
A performance is mercantile when there is no substantial defect, that
is, when-
(i) the delivered lot is of such character as not in a material manner
to increase the risks or burdens which would rest on the buyer under
exact performance; and
(ii) it is of such character as reasonably to meet the operating or
marketing requirements of the buyer in the course of his business, in
general, and where the contract looks to a particular purpose, then also
in regard to that particular purpose. 67
To the objection that this would lead to greater uncertainty, Llewellyn
replies that "[t]he proposed policy presupposes the availability of a skilled
and specialized mercantile tribunal to pass on the question of fact. .... -68
Having recognized the need for special rules governing transactions be-
tween merchants, however, the 1941 text further authorizes courts to extend
the special rules to transactions not between merchants "if the reason and
convenience of the provision justify so doing. 69 The draftsman is cautious.
61. Id. §§ I-D, -E(2). Section 1-D states:
Between merchants, the usage of trade, or of a particular trade, and any course
of dealing between the parties, are presumed to be the background which the
parties have presupposed in their bargaining and have intended to read into the
particular contract; and express words are to be construed, where that is
reasonable, as consistent with, rather than as a displacement of, such usage and
course of dealing.
Compare U.C.C. §§ 1-205, 2-202, -208. Section I-E of the 1941 draft governs conflict of usage.
Compare U.C.C. § 1-205(2), (5), (6).
62. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 42, §§ I ("mercantile sufficiency"), I I-A. Compare U.C.C. §§
2-508, -601.
63. Uniform Sales Act § 49. For discussion of this point, see 1941 DRAFT, supra note 42, at
101-03. See generally Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 457 (1949).
64. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 42, § I I-A(2)(a). The buyer continues to have a right to recover
damages for defective performance. Id.
65. Llewellyn stressed the desirability of incorporating a statement of purpose into the text
itself as well as in the accompanying comments. See, e.g., id. at 19.
66. Id. § I I-A(2)(c).
67. Id. § I I-A(2)(b).
68. Id. at 101 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 103-04.
69. Id. § I-B.
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Transactions between merchants are known; sound and feasible rules can be
set out in the draft text. Non-mercantile situations have not been sufficiently
explored to ensure that the policy of a mercantile rule is properly applicable
to the new situation. The draft text calls on courts to find implicit coverage
where the "reason" of the text is relevant. 70
Provisions in the 1941 draft are drastically curtailed in the next generally-
circulated draft, the Uniform Revised Sales Act of 1944.71 The definitions of
"merchant" and "between merchants" are recast and emphasis is placed on
the definition of "merchant. '72 Courts retain the power to extend rules
applicable "between merchants" to other transactions "when the circum-
stances and underlying reasons justify extending its application. '73 The
expert merchant tribunal and the leeway provided by the concept of mercan-
tile performance, however, are deleted without explanation.7 4 These provi-
sions were replaced by a general duty to carry out obligations under the Act
in good faith. The definition of "good faith" includes not only honesty in
fact but also, in the case of merchants, reasonable observance of commer-
cial standards.
75
The 1944 draft does, however, include an elaborate Comment on the
definition of "merchant" which continues to stress the special needs of
professionals. 76 It suggests that courts had recognized these needs and that
the revision simply spells out the implications of the earlier law. "[W]here
experience has shown a certain type of rule to be clearly useful and applica-
ble at least between merchants, [the Act states] the rule as generally applica-
ble to that extent, and leave[s] to the Courts and where necessary the jury
the issue of its possible extension . . . ."7
Subsequent drafts of the sales provisions follow the basic pattern of the
1944 draft with respect to the merchant provisions. As these early drafts
circulated more and more widely, growing concern was expressed regarding
the special provisions for merchants. In a leading article attacking the Code,
Professor Williston, draftsman of the 1906 Act and author of the leading
commentary on that Act, complained of the "novel" definition of "mer-
chant." 78 All persons engaged in buying or selling goods, he argued, should
be subject to the same rights and duties. 79 He also suggested that the
definition of "merchant" was ambiguous and that authority to extend a
70. Id. at 51.
71. ALl JOINT EDITORIAL COMMITTEE, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944) (Sales
Chapter of Proposed Commercial Code) [hereinafter cited as 1944 DRAFT].
72. Id. § 7(1), (3).
73. Id. § 1(3). See generally comment on § I. Id. at 72-78. Note in particular the suggestion
that the "reason" of the special "good faith" standards for merchants (§ 10(1); see note 74
infra) might be extended to a non-merchant "insofar as the person is chargeable with the
standards laid down for merchants." Id. at 77.
74. Exact performance is required, subject to the obligation of good faith. Id. §§ 10(l),
26(2). See also comment on §10. Id. at 97.
75. Id. § 10(l).
76. Comment on § 7. Id. at 89-93. Authorship may be attributed to Llewellyn.
77. Id. at 91-92.
78. Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L.
REV. 561, 572-73 (1950).
79. Id. at 573.
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mercantile rule to non-merchants would lead to uncertainty.8 ° Williston's
colleagues at the Harvard Law School, however, did not find these objec-
tions conclusive." A committee of an American Bar Association section
reserved judgment on the wisdom of these special rules, recognizing strong
arguments on both sides.82 At the urging of ABA representatives, however,
the Editorial Board of the Code did vote to delete the subsection authorizing
courts to extend rules applicable between merchants to non-professionals.8 3
The higher "good faith" obligations imposed on merchants was also subject
to considerable criticism. 84
On publication of the Final Text edition in November 1951 the Uniform
Commercial Code included special definitions of "merchant" and "between
merchants," a number of special rules for transactions between mer-
chants,85 and a general obligation on merchants in sales transactions to act
not only honestly but also in accordance with "reasonable commercial
standards of fair dealing in the trade." 86 Criticism of these Code provisions
continued. On several occasions Llewellyn defended these provisions be-
fore the New York Law Revision Commission, which subjected the Code to
close scrutiny over a three-year period.8 7 In an elaborate response to a
memorandum submitted by a committee of the Commerce and Industry
Association of New York Llewellyn stressed that the existence of special
professional rules was ancient and that the Uniform Sales Act itself recog-
nized this.a8 He noted that the pervasive use of "usage of trade" in the Code
necessarily required distinguishing professionals from non-professionals.
He also argued that justice required the classification: "[s]ound and wise
building of rules of law calls for sound and wise classification of the
problem-situations."' Finally, he suggested that courts would be justified in
taking an issue away from the jury if the statute referred to "merchants."9
80. Id.
81. Report on Article 2-Sales by Certain Members of the Faculty of Harvard Law School,
6 Bus. LAW. 151, 154 (1951). The authors do not mention Professor Williston as the source of
these criticisms. For an indication of how seriously those involved with the Code took Profes-
sor Williston's criticism on this point, see Letter from Walter D. Malcolm to Judge Herbert F.
Goodrich (Nov. 21, 1950), reprinted in 6 Bus. LAW. 164-66 (1951).
82. Report of Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAW. 119, 126 (1951).
83. Hearing Before Enlarged Editorial Board, Jan. 27-29, 1951, 6 Bus. LAW. 164, 181-82
(1951). See also Professor Kripke's comment on the ambiguity of the definition of "merchant."
Id. at 182-83.
84. Report, supra note 82, at 126-28. See also note 154 infra and accompanying text. For
the legislative history of the "good faith" provisions see Braucher, The Legislative History of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 812-14 (1958); Summers, "Good
Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54
VA. L. REV. 195, 207-13 (1968).
85. For a list and classification of these merchant provisions see U.C.C. § 2-104, Comment
2. See also Dolan, supra note 45; Newell, supra note 45.
86. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b).
87. For comment on the Commission's study of the Code in the context of an evaluation of
the Commission's work see MacDonald, Legal Research Translated into Legislative Action:
The New York Law Revision Commission 1934-1963, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 401, 435-38, 450-52
(1963). For a reflection by Llewellyn on the Commission's study of the Code see K. LLEWEL-
LYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 183 n. 186 (1960).
88. 1 REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1954, at 107-08. See also
id. at 165-66.
89. Id. at 108.
90. Id. The full comment states:
But more important for the men of commerce is another phase of classifica-
tion: If the statute says 'reasonable,' you go to the jury with no guidance at all.
If the statue says 'commercially reasonable,' the jury is politely requested to
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Whether or not through Llewellyn's efforts, the New York Commission
suggested only minor amendments and did not question the basic principle
of separate rules for merchants.9 ' The 1958 Official Text differs on this point
only slightly from the first Final Text of 1951.92
Sketchy as this review of the Code "merchant" provisions is, it neverthe-
less suggests the complexity which lies behind the assumption that the final
text of article II is a true measure of Llewellyn's jurisprudence. One does
not know why many changes were made. Indeed, one does not know
whether Llewellyn himself made the decision to amend or omit. His lifelong
interest in commercial dispute-resolution, 93 for example, suggests that he
regretted the deletion of the expert merchant tribunal provided in the 1941
draft text.- He may have decided, however, that this innovation would be
unacceptable to state legislatures; he may have concluded that the institu-
tion was of low priority because of the resurgence of the "Grand Style" of
reasoning by the state courts dealing with major commercial disputes. 95
The review of these "merchant" provisions does lay the groundwork,
however, for noting several major themes in Llewellyn's thought which
Professor Danzig does not examine closely enough. These themes are
Llewellyn's concern for "lump-concept thinking" and his emphasis on the
"private law" nature of the Code.
Liewellyn consistently attacked the use of lump concepts to solve distinct
practical problems. His strictures on the concept of title are the most famous
of these attacks. As early as his 1930 Sales casebook, Llewellyn contrasted
lump-concept thinking with narrow-issue thinking when discussing title.
try to play the part of a man-in-the-trade-which helps some. But if the statute
says 'dealer' or 'merchant,' the court can in case after case take the issue from
the jury. This means precedent and certainty, steadily building. If the classifica-
tion makes sense, the results are satisfactory in justice, they speed judicial
administration, they increase certainy for counselors in advance as well as for
advocates. If the classification makes sense.
d. (emphasis in original). The comment should be contrasted with the earlier emphasis on the
need for the expert merchant tribunal. See notes 50-60 supra and the accompanying text.
91. REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1956, at 366.
92. Comment 2 was introduced in the place of two earlier comments on U.C.C. § 2-104.
93. See, e.g., K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 87, at 333-34. See also id. at 327; Llewellyn, The
First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873, 874 (1939). The institution of an expert
merchant tribunal as found in the 1941 draft, see note 50 supra and accompanying text, is also
suggested in Phillips, A Practical Method for the Determination of Business Fact, 82 U. PA. L.
REV. 230, 250-51 (1934). For a comment by Llewellyn on this article see Llewellyn, On
Warranty of Quality, and Society: 11, 37 CoL'uM. L. REV. 341, 392 n.132 (1937).
Llewellyn's concern for the practical problem of proof is worth stressing. He recognized the
difficulty of presenting evidence of trade usage. Without an institution such as Llewellyn
proposes in the 1941 draft, for example, summary judgment will be denied if there is a
colorable claim that usage ot trade supplements or even qualifies an agreement. See Modine
Mfg. Co. v. North East Independent School Dist., 503 S.W.2d 833, 837-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For a general discussion of the practical implications of the
Code's jurisprudence see Murray, The Realism of Behaviorism Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 51 ORE. L. REV. 269, 300-01 (1972).
94. See notes 50-60 supra and the accompanying text.
95. A major theme of Llewellyn's later work is his belief that contemporary courts were
returning to a "Grand Style" of reasoning. See 1941 DRAFT, supra note 42, at 25; K. LLEWEL-
LYN, supra note 87, passim. Llewellyn contrasted the "Grand Style" with the "Formal Style."
The first he defined as " 'Precedent' guided, but 'principle' controlled; and nothing was good
'Principle' which did not look like wisdom-in-result for the welfare of All-of-us." The latter he
defined: " 'Precedent' was to control, not merely to guide; 'Principle' was to be tested by
whether it made for order in the law, not by whether it made wisdom-in-result." Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons about How Statutes are
to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 3% (1950).
SOUTHWESTERN LA W JOURNAL
Lump-concept thinking moves in terms of wide premises. Decide that
on specific facts 'title' is in either B or S; and you can then proceed to
draw a dozen conclusions, as to risk, price, rules of damages, levy by
creditors, etc.; among the dozen will be one deciding the case in
hand. . . . The narrow issues that arise on questions of 'title' are
largely questions involving the allocation of a great number of distinct
risks: risk of destruction; risk of disposing of the goods (can S have
price, or only damages?); risk of being able to cover in the event of non-
delivery (time and place of measure of damages); risk of S's insolvency(B opposing S's creditors); risk of S's or B's dishonesty or bad faith
(attempted fraudulent resale to a third party). Each of these risk prob-
lems raises policy questions all its own; different facts have different
significance in regard to the different questions-as a matter of sense.
Narrow-issue thinking leads to weighing these differences as a matter of
sense, in order to see whether similar differences should follow, in
law. 96
This theme is also developed in a series of articles published in the late
1930's which trace the development of Anglo-American sales law "Through
Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond": 97 "In a word, the Title-concept lumps
so many policy decisions together that the same decision about Title, in two
cases having similar facts, would repeatedly lead to unfortunate results in
one or the other, according to the issue."9g Llewellyn did not suggest the
elimination of the Title-concept but he would relegate it to use as merely a
"general residuary clause." '
Article II adopts Llewellyn's iconoclastic approach to "title," much to
the consternation of Professor Williston."° The Comment to the very first
section of article II states:
The arrangement of the present Article is in terms of contract for sale
and the various steps of its performance. The legal consequences are
stated as following directly from the contract and action taken under it
without resorting to the idea of when property or title passed or was to
pass as being the determining factor. The purpose is to avoid making
practical men turn upon the location of an intangible something, the
passing of which no man can prove by evidence and to substitute for
such abstractions proof of words and actions of a tangible character.'
96. K. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 565 (1930). See generally
id. at 561-73. Although the numerous reviews of this casebook note the innovative approach
taken by Llewellyn to the materials, none links the organization of his casebook to the intensive
Columbia Law School review of the curriculum, 1926-1928. But see W. TWINING, supra note
20, at 57, 128-40 (especially pp. 135-37). A contrast between Llewellyn's approach and that of
the Columbia Law School study deserves further elaboration. See H. OLIPHANT, SUMMARY OF
STUDIES IN LEGAL EDUCATION BY THE FACULTY OF LAW OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 128-35
(1928).
97. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society (pts. I & 2), 36 COLUM. L. REV. 699(1936), 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341 (1937); Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and A Bit Beyond,
15 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 159 (1938); Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725
(1939); Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873 (1939). These
articles have been described by one commentator as perhaps "Llewellyn's most durable
work." Gordon, Introduction: J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition in American
Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 9, 28 n.61 (1975). Rather surprisingly, Professor
Danzig pays no attention to these articles.
98. Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 159, 171(1938).
99. Id. at 170.
100. Williston, supra note 78, at 566-72.
101. U.C.C. § 2-101, Comment.
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Section 2-401 sets out the residual general rule on location of title, a rule to
be applied only when a specific Code provision did not provide a par-
ticularized solution.
10 2
What is less frequently recognized is that Llewellyn also pointed out that
"seller" and "buyer" are lump concepts and that the article II "merchant"
provisions reflect Llewellyn's attempt to replace "lump-concept thinking"
with "narrow-issue thinking."'0 3 In the same article which contained the
devastating attack on "title," Llewellyn states that
the traditional lump-concept 'Seller,' in terms of which the Uniform
Sales Act is cast, has lost working value not only in the measure in
which sellers, and selling units, and business units which have sales
units as adjuncts, have come to vary in complexity and power; but has
lost value also as growing economic differentiation has channeled the
activities and interests of significantly different types of seller (or
buyer) into different lines. . . . In consequence, and in test of the
thesis that the concepts basic to the 'general law of Sales' are in many
aspects not only too general but in their lines of generality poorly
adjusted to the facts, I concentrate upon a single portion of the mate-
rial, itself manifold enough: the mercantile.'°4
This same theme is also developed in Llewellyn's other articles written at
this time. 0 5 For example, when discussing the buyer's right to reject non-
conforming goods even for trivial defects Llewellyn remarks that reasonable
adjustment by merchants is proper and to allow rejection for nontroubling
defects is bad policy."° "The difficulty," Llewellyn adds,
lies of course in trying to regulate by a single set of rules such situations
as farm machinery, a contractor-buyer of stuff to be used in a job
already under way, a girl who finds that the collar of the dress does not
set off her hair as she had thought it would, a grocer whose customers
feel that cardboard boxes are not of proper grade if they are dented-
and a merchant-to-merchant shipment of timber or wool or apples or
grain which is pretty close to the agreement. °0
The Code "merchant" provisions break down the general (lump) rules of the
Uniform Sales Act of 1906 and apply many rules to narrower classes of
transactions. 108
102. Id. § 2-401. "Title" has not been eliminated entirely. See, e.g., id. §§ 2-106(l), -
327(!)(a). For the references to "title" in the consignment provisions see Winship, The "True"
Consignment Under the Uniform Commercial Code, and Related Peccadilloes, 29 Sw. L.J. 825,
849-50 (1975).
103. See reference to this point in R. SPEIDEL, R. SUMMERS & J. WHITE, supra note 37, at
657.
104. Llewellyn, supra note 98, at 163-64. See also id. at 160 n.2.
105. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. REV. 873, 874-75, 903-04
(1939); Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: H, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 388-89,
396-97 (1937).
106. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: 1H, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 341, 389
(1937).
107. Id. at 389 n. 126. See 1941 DRAFT, supra note 42, § II-A. See also notes 64-68 supra and
accompanying text. Compare U.C.C. § 2-601.
108. Llewellyn insisted, however, that despite the Uniform Sales Act the better judges have
distinguished the mercantile fact-situation. See, e.g., Llewellyn's memorandum to the New
York Law Revision Commission. I REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR
1954, at 107-08. In this memorandum he makes the following general point about classification
and rules: "The building of rules of law is by its very nature based on classification. Sound and
wise building of rules of law calls for sound and wise classification of the problem-situations.
Such classification makes for justice-in-result .... " Id. at 108.
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Breaking down general rules into more specific rules prescribed for lim-
ited fact situations is typical of article II. Although this approach is perva-
sive throughout that article, an excellent example is the allocation of risk of
loss in sections 2-509 and 2-510 of the Code. These sections first define the
situation in which the rule is to operate, then announce the rule which
allocates the risk in that situation. 1° 9 After several specific situations and
rules are set out, two residual rules are announced: one for merchants and
one for non-merchants.110 The Comment then spells out the policy underly-
ing the allocation of risk: actual control of goods and likelihood of the
party's having insurance."1 ' These sections of the Code are classic examples
of Llewellyn's goal in drafting "the amendment-resistant Uniform Act for a
whole broad field": "an unmistakable indication, first, of the direction of
the provision; second, of the reason for picking that direction for that
situation; third, of the reason for seeing the situation covered as being a
significant unit of coverage."'12
In other words, article II adopts narrow-issue thinking in many of its
sections. These sections focus attention on the situation and reason for the
rules. A court may extend or limit a Code rule if the situation or reason so
suggests. But in so acting the Court is guided by a prior legislative statement
of policy. These narrow-issue sections are far more common than Professor
Danzig implies when he focuses on the "troublesome vacuity" of the
unconscionability provision of section 2-302.1"3 The narrow-issue provisions
do not necessarily contradict Danzig's theme that the courts carry the
weight of lawmaking in Llewellyn's jurisprudence because the Code encour-
ages the courts to read the legislation liberally."I4 They do suggest, however,
that Danzig's evidence is incomplete and his conclusion too broad.
109. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-509(l)(a):
Situation: if there is an absence of breach (caption; see U.C.C. § 1-109); and where the
contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the goods by carrier (U.C.C. § 2-509(l)
preamble); and if it does not require him to deliver them at a particular destination (U.C.C. § 2-
509(l)(a) first clause); and whether or not the shipment is under reservation (U.C.C. § 2-
509(I)(a) last clause).
Rule: the risk of loss passes to the buyer when the goods are duly delivered to the carrier
(U.C.C. § 2-509(I)(a)).
Similar limitation of situation followed by rule can be found in U.C.C. §§ 2-509(l)(b), (2).
U.C.C. § 2-5 10 can be broken down in a similar manner beginning with the limitation that there
has been a breach of contract.
110. U.C.C. § 2-509(3).
11l. U.C.C. § 2-509, Comment 3. The comments also stress that the section adopts "the
contractual approach rather than an arbitrary shifting of the risk with the 'property' in the
goods." U.C.C. § 2-509, Comment 1.
112. 1941 DRAFr, supra note 42, at 26; see note 30 supra.
113. Danzig, supra note 4, at 627. To be fair to Danzig he does refer in passing to certain
"per se" rules, including § 2-509. Id. at 633 n.44 and the accompanying text.
I think it typical of Danzig's approach that he should choose § 2-302 and cite Leff's article
(supra note 18) as the "leading commentary." Danzig, supra note 4, at 627 n.22. Section 2-302
has stirred up considerable academic controversy. In an important recent study of the German
version of the unconscionability concept Professor John P. Dawson calls Leff's article the
"silliest" of the numerous articles on the subject. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The
German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041, 1041 n.I (1976). Dawson suggests that an article by
Ellinghaus is the best of these articles. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE
L.J. 757 (1969). Ellinghaus is suggestive, if not altogether clear, on the role the Code's general
provisions, including § 2-302, should play. See id. at 759-61, 796-803.
The assumption that § 2-302 is typical of the Uniform Commercial Code sometimes leads
even astute commentators astray. See, e.g., Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1704-05 (1976).
114. U.C.C. 99 1-102(l), (2), Comment 1.
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In addition, Professor Danzig does not do justice to Llewellyn's own
perception that sales law, the law governing primarily transactions between
merchants, is private law. Danzig himself notes that merchants are a sub-
community with its own mechanisms for resolving disputes and with its own
sense of fairness." 5 He suggests that this "situational factor" is strongly
reinforced by Llewellyn's jurisprudential preferences, but he nowhere sug-
gests that Llewellyn shared this perception that merchants form a special
subcommunity. More than Llewellyn's general jurisprudence is involved;
Llewellyn consciously adapted his approach to the Code to his belief that
commercial rules are private law rules."
6
Anglo-American legal theory does not divide law into public and private
law. 117 Llewellyn, however, did make this distinction and clearly included
sales law in the area of private law, although he recognized that the distinc-
tion is not clear-cut. In a report he drafted for a Committee on Curriculum of
the Association of American Law Schools he notes that there is no sugges-
tion "that there can be any law which is not in material part 'public' ";1l8 but
he goes on to characterize subjects in "private law" as "relatively fixed and
slow moving, relatively simple in subject-matter and background, relatively
established in their basic policies, relatively confined to judicial action on
both the regulative and enforcement sides."" 19
One characteristic of private law, and especially of sales law when regard-
ed as rules governing professional businessmen, is that there is little clash of
interests. "[M]ost of the Sales field is uncolored as most other law is not by
the clash of class and passion."' 20 In a report accompanying an early draft,
the Sales statute is referred to as "both non-political, and non-criminal, in
character."'' Defending the Code before the New York Law Revision
Commission, Llewellyn again stressed the "non-political" character of
commercial law.' 22 By his suggestion that article II rules be limited, in many
cases, to transactions between merchants, Llewellyn limits the rules to
situations where experience shows that all interests are satisfied by the rule.
115. Danzig, supra note 4, at 622-23. In a revealing casual phrase Danzig characterizes
commercial law as "at the margin of public law." Id. at 622. It is difficult to believe that Danzig
would recognize the possibility of any private law. He apparently would always require
legislation to state the "ideal" rule: i.e., to make law means to make a moral choice. It is
difficult, however, to perceive what moral choices Danzig would actually recommend in
transactions between merchants.
116. Danzig suggests that Llewellyn's "unusual" view of the legal process was in many
respects a result of "his lifelong immersion in contract law." Danzig, supra note 4, at 622 n.5. I
would qualify this only by stressing that Llewellyn was particularly interested in commercial
contracts and commercial dispute resolution. See notes 93, 97 supra. See also W. TWINING,
supra note 20, at 338-40.
117. See, however, Professor Wolfgang Friedmann's remark that the division between
public and private law is of growing significance in English and American law. W. FRIEDMANN,
LEGAL THEORY 232 (5th ed. 1967).
118. Committee on Curriculum of the Association of American Law Schools, The Place of
Skills in Legal Education, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 345, 378 n.16 (1945).
119. Id. at 378 (emphasis in original).
120. Llewellyn, Across Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725, 726 (1939). See,
however, the interesting comment on the failure of interest groups to mobilize before the
NCCUSL in the preparation of the Uniform Sales Act. Llewellyn, supra note 106, at 382-83.
121. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 42, at 25. See also Llewellyn's September 1940 memorandum
reprinted in W. TWINING, supra note 20, at 524.
122. See Statement to the Law Revision Commission by Professor Karl N. Llewellyn, I
REPORT OF THE NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1955, passim.
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A second characteristic of the private law of contracts is that private
parties are permitted to arrive at "dickered" deals which a court will
enforce in the absence of an overriding public interest. This "freedom of
contract" premise is so basic it is assumed in the Code background mate-
rials. The 1941 Report on the Revised Uniform Sales Act states briefly its
assumption-in-policy: "The Draft proceeds upon the assumption-in-policy
that buyers and sellers ought (within the limits of such rules as those on
legality) to be free to bargain as they choose.' 1 23 The policy lies behind
section 1-102(3), which in effect permits parties to agree on any matter
without reference to Code rules except where Code rules are mandatory.124
Llewellyn did acknowledge the growth of public law regulation of com-
mercial matters. He recognizes that regulatory statutes and governmental
standards, as well as changes in commercial practices, have resulted in the
waning in relative importance of traditional sales law. 125 In 1941 he ex-
pressed amazement at the interest in the proposed revision of the Uniform
Sales Act. "The presence of so much active interest in basic 'private' law at
a time when men's minds are of necessity so largely occupied with the
'public' phases of law, is indeed little less than astounding.,,126 The study of
"public" commercial law is important 127 but, as for so many topics in which
Llewellyn took an interest, Llewellyn never found time to explore the
subject in depth. One of the ironies of the successful promulgation of the
Code is that the number of transactions it governs will become increasingly
limited by regulatory statutes. 128 For a scholar with Llewellyn's historical
insight, this is an irony he would appreciate.
C. Courts and Legislatures
Danzig's article focuses on the respective roles of courts and legislatures.
He criticizes Llewellyn for minimizing "the differences between the ways
courts and legislatures operate.'1 29 At one level this criticism assumes that
these institutions have unique functions or capacities and that Llewellyn
sins by having one institution carry out functions of the other. There are
references to delegation of legislative decisions 130 as "derogation of the
123. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 42, at 24.
124. The history of U.C.C. § 1-102(4) should be studied further. Initially, each section in
article II was examined to see if it should be subject to contrary agreement of the parties. If it
was, the phrase "unless otherwise agreed" was added; if the rule was mandatory, the phrase
was omitted. Only later was § 1-102(4) inserted. See S. MENTSCHIKOFF, COMMERCIAL TRANSAC-
TIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (1970). Llewellyn recognized the distinction between "Iron
Rules" and "Rules of Help or Supplement." Llewellyn, supra note 106, at 385. For an
excellent discussion of the different forms commercial rules may take see R. SPEIDEL, R.
SUMMERS & J. WHITE, supra note 37, at 2-5.
125. Llewellyn, supra note 120, at 726.
126. 1941 DRAFT, supra note 42, at 7.
127. See Llewellyn, supra note 3, at 808-10. In this article Llewellyn outlines a projected
Coursebook on American Institutions which he never completed. For the modern period
Llewellyn proposes to spend almost twice as much time on regulatory law as opposed to
traditional private case law. See also Committee on Curriculum, supra note 118, at 378-85.
128. For a similar assessment see L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 581-82(1973). Professor Friedmann has also put this observation in a theoretical framework. Fried-
mann, Law Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J. 351, 356-57 (1969).
129. Danzig, supra note 4, at 635.
130. Id.
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legislative function,' 131 and a "renunciation of legislative responsibility and
power.' 32 Similarly, the form of the Code is also criticized for not being
"statutory" enough: it "reads very much like a judicial opinion"; 3' it is
frequently phrased in "a most common law manner." 34 To this is added the
suggestion that these views are suspect because "unusual" and not "tradi-
tional."'
This level of Danzig's criticism is difficult to take seriously either as a
matter of practice or of theory. Historically, courts and legislatures in many
political systems have common origins and at different stages in their evolu-
tion they have performed different functions. Political systems as closely
related to the United States as that of England and France allocate law-
making authority in a different way. Theoretically, the simple court-legisla-
ture dichotomy omits the extremely important role of the executive or
administrative agency as law-maker or dispute-resolver.
At a second level Danzig's argument deserves more attention. There are
two attributes of legislatures, not shared by courts, which legitimate the
allocation to legislature of the task of law-making. They can adopt general
rules which maximize social utility and they can adopt rules which actively
shape society because they are "democratically elected and politically re-
sponsive." '"36 There is also a suggestion that legislatures have resources or
"tools"" 7 not available to courts. As general propositions there is little
difficulty in accepting these arguments, but the distinctions Danzig draws
are questions of degree rather than kind,"38 and there are questions he leaves
unanswered." 39 Whether or not Danzig's arguments are acceptable, the
important point for understanding Llewellyn's thought is that Llewellyn did
not address these arguments.
Surprisingly, Professor Danzig does not draw on Llewellyn's discussions
of statutory interpretation in which Llewellyn comes closest to addressing
Danzig's arguments. The basic theme of these writings is that judges should
131. Id.
132. Id. at 622. Danzig also criticizes Llewellyn for "denigrating" [sic] "the traditional role
of the legislature." Id. at 631.
133. Id. at 635.
134. Id. at 632-33.
135. See, e.g., id. at 622, 623, 631, 632.
136. Id. at 625. See also Danzig's comment on judges: they are "of low visibility and low
responsibility from the standpoint of the larger public." Id. at 630.
137. Id. at 625. Danzig uses "tools" in a special sense. Ethics and economics guide
legislatures in lawmaking, whereas Llewellyn draws on the "methods and messages of sociolo-
gy and anthropology." Id.
138. Implicit in Danzig's discussion, for example, is a contrast of the legislature's theoretical
ability to take into account the interests of all groups when formulating general rules with the
court's resolution of only a particular dispute between specific interested parties. In practice
this is a difference of degree only. There are liberal procedural rules for intervention and for
submission of amicus briefs. Moreover, many judges consider potential general impact of their
particular rulings. Legislators, on the other hand, face lobby groups with widely varying
resources and the lawmakers are often required to make political trade-offs. As a result, no
particular piece of legislation necessarily maximizes social welfare.
139. Underlying Danzig's discussion is the suggestion that legislatures should be active:
legislative passivity is condemned. See, e.g., Danzig, supra note 4, at 627. But if "dickered"
agreements maximize the parties' well-being, is it necessary to have any legal rules beyond
"passive" enabling ones? Indeed, should any area of the law be left to common law devel-
opment? Danzig's brief discussion of the first question leaves one hanging. Danzig, supra note
4, at 630. Nor is it clear what Danzig believes the role of judges should be.
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decide cases in the "Grand Style" in which no distinction is made between
the handling of prior cases and statutes. As Llewellyn wrote in The Common
Law Tradition:
This book is not, as a book, about how our State supreme courts do deal
or ought to deal with statutes. Yet again and again, in order to avoid
misinterpretation, I have had to insist that the range of techniques
correctly available in dealing with statutes is roughly equivalent to the
range correctly available in dealing with case law materials. ,40
Judges whom Llewellyn respected, such as Frankfurter and Cardozo, he
criticized for "formal self-prostration before the legislative power.' 14'
Frankfurter writes, talks, thinks, and feels in the case law bailiwick or
in that of such broader Constitutional provisions as 'due process' in the
Holmes tradition of conscious and responsible, although ordered and
restrained, creation; but on a point of statutory construction he can
write in a fog or phantasmagoria of fictional legislative intent and of ajudicial powerlessness and consequent non- or irresponsibility that for-
feits all intellectual contact with the Grand Tradition of case law.' 42
In effect, case law and statutory materials have equal authority because they
are both ultimately subject to court interpretation using similar techniques.
Llewellyn elaborated on how a court should approach statutory construc-
tion in a published article 143 directed toward that very problem.
If a statute is to be merged into a going system of law . . . the court
must do the merging, and must in so doing take account of the policy of
the statute--or else substitute its own version of such policy. Creative
reshaping of the net result is thus inevitable.144
He points out, however, that there are two kinds of policy: the immediate
problem the legislator addressed in the statute and the underlying policy to
be applied to unforeseen situations. In the latter case,
the quest is not properly for the sense originally intended by the statute,
for the sense sought originally to be put into it, but rather for the sense
which can be quarried out of it in the light of the new situation. Broad
purposes can indeed reach far beyond details known or knowable at the
time of drafting.' 45
The function of the courts, according to Llewellyn, is to accept the legisla-
ture's choice of policy and to construe the legislation freely in order to
implement the policy.
Some Code provisions and Comments reflect these views, 146 although as
indicated earlier Danzig exaggerates the extent of these open-ended provi-
sions. Ironically, if the Code incorporates Llewellyn's perspective on the
role of the courts, the ultimate responsibility for this lies with the state
legislatures which adopted the Code. Few, if any, of these legislatures acted
140. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 87, at 371. See also id. at 125-26, 371-82.
141. Id. at 380.
142. Id. Compare Llewellyn's remarks on Scrutton in Llewellyn, supra note 98, at 186 n.48.
143. Llewellyn, supra note 95.
144. Id. at 400. Passages from this article are reprinted in K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 87, at
373-75.
145. Llewellyn, supra note 95, at 400 (emphasis in original).
146. See, e:g., U.C.C. § 1-102, Comment 1. Lewellyn did not hesitate to insert policy
statements in the comments if.outvoted on the text. See Llewellyn, supra note 27, at 782, 794.
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as the social-maximizing lawmakers of Danzig's ideal type. 147 Not that there
was passive acceptance of the Code. Interest groups lobbied; amendments
were made.148 Indeed, so many non-uniform amendments were adopted that
the sponsors created a Permanent Editorial Board to review variations and
itself recommend amendments. 149 These state legislatures in theory could
have refused to "delegate" authority to courts but for the most part they did
not do so. 150
State legislatures, of course, did not undertake thorough revision of the
Uniform Commercial Code because most of them do not have the time or
resources to put together a complicated private law statute. Once this
practical constraint is recognized, it becomes important to determine how
different interests might be recognized in the drafting process prior to
legislative consideration. If some interest groups are not consulted, the
legitimacy of the legislation might be questioned. In this context Llewellyn's
emphasis on democracy in the drafting process takes on greater signifi-
cance.'' True, consumer interests may not have been represented,' but at
least Llewellyn sought to work out a practical solution to this problem of
reconciling actual practice with democratic theory. Danzig's discussion fails
to do justice to the complexity existing institutions pose.
D. Morality and the Code
To Professor Danzig's basic insight into the ethical posture of the Uni-
form Commercial Code I have nothing to add; I only wish I had said it as
well.
Ethical questions are relevant, but they are regarded as posing problems
of discovery rather than choice. The premise appears to be that values
have an objectively ascertainable existence and a near universal accept-
ance and thus can be judicially discovered just as 'reasonable price' can
be ascertained by reference to a market. 53
To Danzig's discussion I would only add an historical footnote. Not only did
the draftsmen believe ethical considerations are relevant, but some busi-
nessmen and business lawyers also took the draftsmen seriously and reacted
violently to provisions such as section 1-203 of the Code. While purporting
to mediate between these -conflicting" points of view, the American Bar
147. The study by the New York Law Revision Commission comes as close as any to
Danzig's ideal type. See note 87 supra. Other state legislatures made varying efforts to assess
the Code. See, e.g., Ruud, The Texas Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 44
TEXAS L. REV. 597 (1966).
148. See, e.g., the state variations on U.C.C. § 2-318. The Code itself now permits states to
choose between three alternatives. In some states the legislature left development in the area of
warranty liability to the courts. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. § 2.318 (Tex. U.C.C.
Vernon 1968); Ruud, supra note 147, at 601-02; Winship, Commercial Transactions, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 31 Sw. L.J. 165, 173 n.46 (1977).
149. See R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, supra note 20, at 29-31.
150. U.C.C. § 2-302, for example, was enacted without amendment in all states except
California and North Carolina, with North Carolina returning to the fold in 1971.
151. See note 29 supra. Llewellyn criticized lawyers who participated in American Bar
Association public activities and "who blithely and skillfully ministered to client and special
interest under the guise of working and thinking for the larger whole." K. LLEWELLYN, supra
note 87, at 332.
152. See I G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.2, at 293 (1965);
Carroll, supra note 19, at 139-43.
153. Danzig, supra note 4, at 629.
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Association committee reviewing the Code recommended amendments to
the "good faith" provisions which were ultimately adopted."54 The reported
violent reaction is somewhat surprising if these provisions, as Danzig sug-
gests, merely reaffirm predominant morals of the marketplace.
IV. CONCLUSION
Professor Richard Danzig has written a suggestive short study of the
jurisprudential underpinnings of article II of the Uniform Commerical Code.
In the course of reviewing his essay I have suggested that Danzig's assump-
tion that article II is a true measure of Karl Llewellyn's jurisprudential
perspective should be reassessed. Closer examination of early drafts of the
Code, especially the special mercantile provisions, reveals Llewellyn's
thought in a purer form and brings out greater complexity in this thought
than Danzig suggests. In particular, Danzig's dichotomy between the proper
roles for courts and legislatures oversimplifies both Llewellyn's approach to
semi-permanent legislation and the characteristics of the provisions of arti-
cle II.
In a key footnote Danzig suggests that his initial intuition was that "Arti-
cle II of the UCC might profitably be analyzed as an attempt to coerce
courts into deciding cases in the Grand Style by means of the devices
described in the text."' After study he concluded, however, that Llewellyn
just did not like statutes. My own review of both Llewellyn's work and
Danzig's presentation leaves me with the belief that Danzig's initial intuition
was correct.
Does it make any difference whether Danzig's intuition or mine is more
accurate? Surely for the jurisprude it makes some slight difference. But
Danzig argues that the student of commercial law should also be concerned
because he or she should read the Code with reference to its philosophic,
sociological, and economic premises. Perhaps. It is dificult, however, to
think of how Danzig's perceptive comments about morals and the Code will
solve the practical problems of the practitioner or of the judge. The Code is
with us no matter how amoral or how far it has gone in delegating legislative
functions to judges. The Code does not dictate any one particular approach
to statutory interpretation. Suggestive though Danzig's essay is, in the last
analysis it is less useful than a growing number of distinguished studies of
Code methodology. 156
154. Report of Committee on the Proposed Commercial Code, 6 Bus. LAW. 119, 126-28
(1951). See also note 84 supra.
155. Danzig, supra note 4, at 632 n.39.
156. See Carroll, supra note 19; Hawkland, Uniform Commercial "Code" Methodology,
1962 U. ILL. L.F. 291; Hillman, Construction ofthe Uniform Commercial Code UCC Section I-
103 and "Code"Methodology, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 655 (1977); Mooney, supra note
21; Nickles, Problems of Sources of Law Relationships Under the Uniform Commercial Code-
Part I: The Methodological Problem and The Civil Law Approach, 31 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1977);
Nickles, Problems of Sources of Law Relationships Under the Uniform Code-Part II: The
English Approach and A Solution to the Methodological Problem, 31 ARK. L. REV. 171 (1977);
Note, The Uniform Commercial Code as a Premise for Judicial Reasoning, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
880 (1965).
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